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ARGUMENT 
I. IN THE COURSE OF GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL 
COURT NOT ONLY FAILED TO PROPERTY DETERMINE WHETHER 
THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS AN INTEGRATED 
CONTRACT BUT IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PROVISIONS OF CONTRACT ARE UNAMBIGUOUS. 
In their Brief, Appellees argue that "because the contract was 
integrated, the trial court was required to construe the language of 
the contract from within the four-corners [sic] of the contract." 
See Brief of Appellees, p. 8. Appellees' argument, for the reasons 
set forth below, is based on both a misapplication of the facts of 
the instant case to legal principles governing the interpretation of 
contracts and an incomplete analysis of such legal principles.1 
According to settled principles of contract law, w [o]nee a court 
determines that an agreement is integrated, parol evidence, although 
not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms 
of the contract, is admissible to clarify ambiguous terms."2 Hall v. 
because the "[i] nterpretation of a written contract is 
ordinarily a question of law, . . . [the appellate court] need not 
defer to the trial court's construction but will make its own 
independent interpretation of the contract terms." Jones v. Hinkle, 
611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). 
2According to Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc., 890 
P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995), "before considering the applicability of the 
parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the court must first 
determine that the parties intended the writing to be an integration. 
To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is 
admissible." Id. at 1026. (Emphasis added.) The trial court erred 
in the course of its threshold determination that the REPC was 
intended to be integrated agreement because it failed to consider 
"any relevant evidence" in the course of doing so. 
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Process Instruments and Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 
1995) (citing Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 
483, 487 (Utah 1986)). Therefore, application of the parol evidence 
rule involves two steps. "First, the court must determine whether 
the agreement is integrated. If the court finds the agreement is 
integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if the court 
makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement 
is ambiguous." Id. at 1027. Further, "a contract provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies.'" Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P. 2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) (citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P. 2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983)). "Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of 
law." Id. 
Although the trial court, in Conclusion of Law No. 2 of its 
Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
concluded that the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) and addendums 
were intended to be an integrated agreement, it erred in its 
determination that the terms of the REPC were unambiguous. The 
provision in section 2(b) of the REPC, "at closing - within 90 Days" 
and the provision in section 24 (e) of the REPC concerning a 
settlement deadline of "April 3 0 - 97" are ambiguous inasmuch as they 
are "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." In fact, 
in the course of arguing that the foregoing terms are unambiguous, 
6 
Appellees essentially acknowledge the ambiguous nature of the 
provisions. When viewed, the aforementioned provisions concerning 
the closing date "may be understood to reach two or more plausible 
meanings." Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
Consequently, parol evidence may be utilized to clarify the ambiguity 
presented by the provisions concerning the date of closing.3 
The plethora of affidavit testimony presented by Mr. Doug 
Allred, the real estate agent who represented the parties in the 
subject transaction, Mr. Parley Baker, and Mr. Brad Mortensen of 
Hi11am Title Company establishes that the Barnes, at the very least, 
knew and understood that Plaintiffs would close on the subject 
property within 90 days of signing of the REPC (R. 215-16, Affidavit 
of Doug Allred, HH 5-6, 9-10; see also R. 82, Affidavit of Parley 
Baker, H 7; R. 149, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, f 7; R. 222, Real 
Estate Purchase Contract, f 2.1(b), which is attached as Exhibit B to 
the Affidavit of Doug Allred). Moreover, Mr. Barnes, himself, 
acknowledged that the 90-day closing deadline by virtue of his 
3At page 12 and footnote 4 of the Brief of Appellees, Appellees, 
in support of their argument concerning ambiguity, argue that 
Appellant's argument "attempts to invalidate the Statute of Frauds . 
. . ." In the course of quoting the Statute of Frauds as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, Appellees delete the critical language 
"for a longer period than one year", which goes to the very purpose 
of the Statute of Frauds. Moreover, the convoluted nature of 
Appellees' argument makes it unclear how the Statute of Frauds is 
relevant to the instant case inasmuch as there was a writing by 
virtue of the REPC subscribed to by and between the parties. 
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attempts to have the transaction closed after the April 30, 1997, 
target closing date but before the 90-day closing deadline set forth 
in the REPC (R. 215-17, Affidavit of Doug Allred, HU 5-6, 9-12; see 
also R. 82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, f 7). 
II. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT MR. ALLRED, ACCORDING TO 
SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY, HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT ON 
BEHALF OF THE" BARNES BOTH IN TERMS OF ACTUAL AND 
APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
The Appellees also argue that Mr. Doug Allred "had no authority 
to vary the terms and conditions of the REPC as a limited agent. See 
Brief of Appellees, p. 13. Again, Appellees' argument is premised 
upon an improper analysis of the law of agency. 
We know from settled law that the key relationship between a 
real estate agent and a client is agency, and that the universal laws 
applying to principals and agents control their rights and 
responsibility. Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) . Moreover, "an agency relationship can arise only at the 
will and by the act of the principal." Id. (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d 
Agency § 17 (1986)). 
Contrary to Appellees' assertions, the record is replete with 
evidence that an agency relationship between the Barnes and Mr. 
Allred was created by both the will and act of the Barnes as 
principal. See Statement of Facts, HU 2-23, set forth in the Brief 
of Appellant. Notwithstanding the fact that the Barnes were 
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personally aware of the 90-day closing deadline, principles of agency 
dictate, as a matter of law, that they, as sellers, were charged with 
knowledge of such inasmuch as Mr. Allred, their agent, was more than 
aware of the 90-day closing deadline. See Foster v. Blake Heights 
Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1974); see also Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro, 646 P.2d 715, 722 (Utah 1982); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 
548, 551-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Interestingly, the carefully 
crafted Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes reveals that Mr. Barnes does not 
deny, whatsoever, that Mr. Allred acted as the Barnes' agent in the 
course of negotiating the subject real property transaction (See R. 
245-54, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes) . In fact, in paragraph 3 of his 
Affidavit, Mr. Barnes admits signing the Listing Agreement & Agency 
Disclosure (Id. at 245, f 3). Moreover, Mr. Barnes, in his 
Affidavit, does not refute the allegations set forth in the Affidavit 
of Mr. Allred, the agent, and confirmed in the Affidavit of Mr. 
Baker, that Mr. Barnes had on numerous occasions inquired about 
closing the transaction after the target date of April 30, 1997, and 
before the 90-day closing deadline set forth in the REPC (See id.). 
In addition, the Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, Manager of Hi11am Title 
Company in Brigham City, who is a disinterested party in the subject 
transaction, establishes that Mr. Barnes had anticipated closing the 
transaction well after the April 30, 1997, target date for closing 
but that he no longer needed to close on the property "inasmuch as he 
had found another source of funds" (R. 148-49, Affidavit of Brad 
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Mortensen, f 7). This is consistent with the affidavit testimony of 
Doug Allred that in conversation with Mr. Barnes, Mr. Barnes had 
admitted selling the property to a third party for cash, and 
therefore, he did not intend to close (R. 217-18, Affidavit of Doug 
Allred, %% 13-15) . 
In addition to Mr. Allred's having actual authority to act on 
behalf of the Barnes by virtue of the listing agreement between the 
Barnes and Mr. Allred, the doctrine of apparent authority applies to 
the facts of the instant case. xxxThe doctrine of apparent authority 
has its roots m equitable estoppel.'" Luddmgton v. Bodenvest Ltd., 
855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 
P.2d 115, 128 (Utah 1992) (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). "x[I]t is 
founded on the idea that where one of two persons must suffer from 
the wrong of a third the loss should fall on that one whose conduct 
created the circumstances which made the loss possible.'" Id. The 
following must be established for apparent authority to apply: 
(1) that the principal has manifested his [of 
her] consent to the exercise of such authority 
or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume 
the exercise of such authority; (2) that the 
third person knew of the facts and, acting m 
good faith, had reason to believe, and did 
actually believe, that the agent possessed such 
authority; and (3) that the third person, 
relying on such appearance of authority, has 
changed his [or her] position and will be 
injured or suffer loss if the act done or 
transaction executed by the agent does not bind 
the principal. 
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3 Am.Jur.2d AgencY § 80 (1986) (cited in Luddington v. Bodenvest 
Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993)). The facts of this case as 
evinced by affidavit testimony and evidence presented to the trial 
court establish that apparent authority applies to the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing as well as that previously submitted to 
the Court by way of the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff respectfully 
asks that this Court reverse the trial court's Oxder granting 
Defendants' MotioA for Summary Judgment, reverse the trial court's 
Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand the 
case for a determination and award of attorney fees incurred on 
appeal as well a3 entry of judgment consistent with the Court's 
opinion. 
/STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Plaintiff need not request oral argument inasmuch as oral 
argument is currently scheduled for March 29, 1999, at 9:30 a.m. In 
light of the significant issues raised in the instant appeal, counsel 
for Plaintiff req\>^sts that the method of disposition of the instant 
11 
appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of guidance in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of March, 1999. 
ARN®i\Sc WIGGINS, P . C . 
Attorneys"!or Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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